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This paper estimates a reduced-form model to assess the insolvency risk of General Insurance (GI) firms 
in the UK. In comparison to earlier studies, it uses a much larger sample including 30 years of data for 
515 firms, and also considers a much wider set of possible determinants of insolvency risk. The empir- 
ical results suggest that macroeconomic and firm-specific factors both play important roles. Other key 
findings are the following: insolvency risk varies across firms depending on their business lines; there 
is default clustering in the GI industry; different reinsurance levels also affect the insolvency risk of in- 
surance firms. The implications of these findings for regulators of GI firms under the newly launched 
Solvency II are discussed. 
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0. Introduction 
The UK’s non-life insurance industry is worth £60bn and is
he largest in Europe and the third largest in the world (after
he US and Japan). It comprises more than 300 active firms (both
omestically- and foreign-owned); 1 in addition, 94 Lloyd’s syn-
icates also underwrite non-life business ( Lloyd’s Annual Report,
014 ). In total, it currently generates approximately £48.217bn in
ross written premium income ( International Underwriting Associ-
tion, 2015 ). 
The failure of insurance firms may disrupt the financial indus-
ry as a whole, increase systemic risk and affect negatively the real
conomy. Solvency I (Directive 73/239/EEC) was introduced in 1973
or the prudential regulation of European insurance companies. It
imed to provide harmonised solvency requirements across the EU We are grateful to the referees for their useful comments, and to Standard & 
oor’s and the Bank of England for data support. We have also benefited from com- 
ents from Dimitris Papachristou, Claus Stefan, Jennifer Khaleghy, Xu Yang, Richard 
inter, David Simmons, Nylesh Shah and others from the General Insurance Divi- 
ion of the Bank of England. 
∗ Corresponding author at: Institute of Economics and Finance, Nanjing Audit 
niversity, 86 West Yushan Road, Nanjing 211815, China. 
E-mail addresses: Guglielmo-Maria.Caporale@brunel.ac.uk (G.M. Caporale), 
uanzhang.nanking@gmail.com (X. Zhang). 
1 In addition, more than 500 non-life insurance firms that are not regulated by 
he UK government are licensed by the European Economic Area to conduct busi- 
ess in the UK (Financial Services Authority, 2013). 
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378-4266/© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleountries. It turned the EU into one of the most competitive mar-
ets in the world. Under Solvency I, all insurers in the EU applied
ne common solvency margin rule establishing the minimum cap-
tal requirements for insurance firms. However, Solvency I did not
ollow a risk-based approach and could not truly reflect the risk
aced by insurers. For example, it considered the book value of as-
ets instead of their market value. 
Solvency II was launched on 1 January 2016, has been imple-
ented in all 28 EU member states including the UK, and has
chieved the harmonisation of asset and liabilities valuation tech-
iques for insurance firms in the EU. In the UK it is managed by
he Prudential Regulation Authority, Bank of England. Solvency II
equires insurers to hold more capital, specifically to have 99.5%
onfidence to cover the worst expected losses over a one-year
orizon. In this case the regulators are taking a risk-based ap-
roach to supervise firms: the riskier an insurer’s business, the
ore provisions are required (which makes it important to inves-
igate the probability of default of different business lines). 
This paper analyses the determinants of insolvency risk for UK
eneral insurance firms rather than non-life and life insurance
rms; this is because the huge difference between non-life and
ife insurers makes it inappropriate to mix them together, as dis-
ussed in more detail in the next section. More specifically, it esti-
ates forward-looking default probabilities that could be useful to
he central bank to supervise local insurance firms (for example,
t could take earlier action in the case of risky firms before theyunder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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a  breach solvency capital requirements). The chosen model could be
used to analyse such issues in other countries as well, with the
empirical results helping policy-makers to improve regulations on
the basis of country-specific features. 
There exist very few studies providing evidence on default
probabilities. This gap in the literature motivates the present pa-
per. It is very difficult to access data on the insolvency risk of gen-
eral insurance firms because very few have become “insolvent” –
the majority choose instead to transfer their business to other in-
surance firms or just stop underwriting new business. As an al-
ternative, third-party rating agencies may provide a good overview
of their financial condition. The main problem with external rating
agencies is that not all insurance firms are rated and the ratings
normally stay the same for many years. Also, different rating agen-
cies such as A M Best, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch have
different rating methodologies and labelling systems. 
Under Solvency II, insolvency risk is defined as the risk of loss
(or of adverse change) in the financial situation of a company
which results from fluctuations in the credit standing of issuers of
securities, counterparties and any debtors to which a Solvency II
undertaking is exposed, in the form of counterparty default risk,
spread risk, or market risk concentration. 2 
In this paper, we assume that the insolvency risk of general
insurance firms is made up of three components. The first is the
credit quality of their investment portfolio, whose performance we
measure using investment returns. The second is the counterparty
risk through reinsurance activity and the purchasing of derivative
contracts. A high reinsurance ratio and holding derivative contracts
increase the credit risk exposure of firms. The reinsurance ratio
and a dummy variable for the use of derivative contracts are there-
fore used in our study to capture this second component. In addi-
tion, the use of derivatives could also lead to an increase in the
risk exposure of a firm, and thus its capital requirements and in-
solvency risk. The third is the direct default risk of insurers when
their liabilities are greater than their assets and therefore they
might become insolvent. The financial health of firms is measured
here using the leverage, profitability, solvency and liquidity ratios.
Size, growth and claims volatility are also taken into account. 
We consider different exit situations for firms, including insol-
vency and transferring business to a third party. Ours is the first
study to use a very large dataset consisting of 30 years of data
for 515 firms to analyse the credit risk of general insurance firms
in the UK. We show that other risk factors (macroeconomic and
firm-specific factors), in addition to the standard ones considered
by the literature (i.e. interest rates, liquidity, profitability and lever-
age) affect insurers’ insolvency. When assessing their profitability,
we take into account profit from both the traditional underwrit-
ing business and investment activities. We estimate both the in-
dividual probability of default (PD) for all available firms and the
joint one using pair correlations. Ours is the first paper to analyse
the systemic risk of general insurance firms in the UK on the basis
of their individual PD. Our results show high dependence between
general insurance firms when their individual PDs are high; this
suggests that the joint probability of default is higher during dis-
tress times. Finally, we examine the relationship between reinsur-
ance and change in the insolvency risk of general insurance firms.
Previous studies find that primary insurers can benefit from rein-
surance contracts in many ways (e.g. they can hedge against risk,
and hold more capital to underwrite new business). We show that
reinsurers may also benefit from reinsurance activities by reducing
their credit risk. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews
the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the data and the various2 Art. 13(32) of the Solvency II Directive. 
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t  eterminants of risk considered. Section 4 outlines the modelling
pproach. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 sum-
arises the main findings and offers some concluding remarks. 
. Literature review 
Insurance firms play a very important role in the economy al-
owing individuals and firms to transfer risk for a premium. The
ankruptcy of insurance firms may reduce financial stability. Many
tudies ( Carmichael and Pomerleano, 2002; Das et al., 2003; Lee,
013 and Lee and Chang, 2015 ) suggest that they can enhance fi-
ancial stability by transferring risk to multiple parties through in-
urance and reinsurance activities. Rothstein (2011) shows that a
ealthy and well-developed insurance industry will improve the
tability of financial markets. In addition, insurance firms protect
ndividuals and corporations from losses arising from natural disas-
ers such as floods etc. ( Faure and Heine, 2011; Kugler and Ofoghi,
005; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2000 ). 
Only a few studies analyse the insolvency risk of insurance
rms because the insurance industry is thought to be less exposed
o turbulence in financial markets than other industries such as
anking. There are several possible reasons for this difference. Un-
ike banks, insurers do not accept deposits from customers, and
herefore they do not face the risk of a sudden shortage in liquid-
ty that may cause bank runs. Harrington (2009) argues that insur-
nce firms have to comply with more rigorous capital requirements
han other financial institutions, and as a result credit events in
he insurance industry have a small effect on the stability of the
nancial system as a whole. Das et al. (2003) suggest that the in-
urance industry is more stable because insurers do not suffer from
ank runs, and the cancellation process for insurance policies takes
onger than closing a bank account. Furthermore, because of larger
remia, policy holders would suffer a loss if the policy were can-
elled. Also, insurance firms often hold more long-term than short-
erm liabilities. Bell and Keller (2009) find that insurers are less in-
erconnected than banks and there is less contagion among them.
owever, Janina and Gregor (2015) argue that insurance firms are
ecoming more similar to banks and increasingly contribute to the
ystemic risk of the financial sector. Further, a study by the Geneva
ssociation (2010) indicates that the insurance industry increases
ystemic risk if insurers engage heavily in trading derivatives off
he balance sheet or mismanage short-term financing activities. 
Recent developments have made the insurance industry less
table; in particular, the fast growth of financial derivatives has
eant that insurance firms have become more engaged with banks
through trading financial derivatives and other investment activ-
ties). Schinasi (2006) and Rule (2001) find that more insurance
rms are buying credit default swaps to hedge their credit risk
nd using alternative risk transfer (ART) tools such as catastrophe
onds to transfer the catastrophe risk to other investors. Also, in-
estment in asset-backed securities has increased. As a result, as
ointed out by Baluch et al. (2011) , insurance firms have become
ore vulnerable during crises. This is also shown by studies such
s those by Das et al. (2003) , who find that linkages through rein-
urance activities may cause several primary insurance firms to fail
t the same time, and by Acharya and Richardson (2014) , who sug-
est that large insurance firms are more likely to invest in high-risk
ssets because they are correlated with different financial institu-
ions. Given the fact that insurance firms are becoming riskier, it is
rucial to examine the drivers of insolvency risk. One of the contri-
utions of this paper is to assess the vulnerability of the UK insur-
nce industry; to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
hat this issue is examined in the case of the UK. 
In addition, the close linkages between insurance firms and
anking crises are such that the failure of the former greatly affects
he stability of financial markets. For example, Main (1982) shows
G.M. Caporale et al. / Journal of Banking and Finance 84 (2017) 107–122 109 
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4 Updated on November 2014. 
5 http://www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-recovery/insights/ 
insurance-insolvency-case-updates-pwc-uk.html . 
6 http://www.fscs.org.uk/what- we- cover/products/insurance/ 
insurance-insolvencies/ . 
7 The insolvency cases include AA Mutual Intl Ins, Andrew Weir Ins, Anglo Amer- 
ican, Atlantic Mutual Intl, BAI (Run-Off), BlackSea&Baltic, Bryanston Ins, Chester 
St Emp, City Intl Ins, Drake Ins, Exchange Ins, FolksamIntl UK, Highlands Ins UK, 
HIH Cas&Gen Ins, Independent Ins, Island Cap Europe, London Auths Mut, Mill- 
burn Ins, Municipal General, North Atlantic Ins, OIC Run-Off, Paramount Ins, Scan 
RE, SovereignMar&Gen, UIC Ins, Baloise Ins Ukbr, East West Ins, Fuji Intl Ins, Hiscox hat banks can avoid some bad debts by working with them. This
s because the information on obligors provided by insurance firms
elps banks to understand better individual and corporate risk ex-
osures. In addition, by mitigating the losses during natural dis-
sters, insurance firms help to reduce the probability of default
f some investors (policy holders, both individual and corporate)
ho, sometimes, are the same obligors as those of banks ( Lee 
t al., 2016 ). Lehmann and Hofmann (2010) show that banks are
ore likely to transfer part or all of their risks to other financial
ectors to avoid high correlation between assets that may lead to a
igher default probability. Trichet (2005) shows that the insurance
nd banking industries are linked by ownership and the associa-
ions of credit exposure. As a result, insurance firms are playing a
entral role in financial markets and this may directly affect banks.
Analysing the insolvency risk of insurance companies and es-
ablishing what causes their bankruptcy can help central bank su-
ervision and reduce systemic risks in the financial industry. Most
revious studies on credit risk focus on banking crises; early warn-
ng systems are well developed for banks (e.g., Kaminsky and Rein-
art, 1999; Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Drehmann and Juselius,
014; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Barell et al., 2010 ;
chularick and Taylor, 2012 ). A few papers also study general in-
urance firms in the UK. One of the most recent papers on the UK
on-life insurance industry is by Adams and Jiang (2016) , who ex-
mine the relation between outside board directors and six mea-
ures of financial performance using panel data for 1999–2012
rawn from the UK’s general insurance industry. Analysing unbal-
nced (1987–2010) panel data, Upreti and Adam (2015) find that
einsurance enables primary insurers to have sufficient risk capac-
ty for planning and pricing new business lines. Shiu (2011) uses
ata from 1985 to 2002 to investigate the relationship between
einsurance and capital structure; he shows that insurers with
igher leverage tend to purchase more reinsurance, and those with
igher reinsurance dependence tend to have a higher level of debt.
sing the same database, Shiu (2007) shows that an insurer’s size,
iquidity, interest rate risk exposure, line of business concentration
nd organisational form are important factors associated with the
ecision to employ financial derivatives. Adam et al. (2003) explore
he determinants of credit ratings in the UK insurance industry
nalysing a sample of 65 firms over the period from 1993 to 1997;
hey find that mutual insurers are generally given higher ratings
han non-mutual ones, and also that liquidity and profitability have
 significant positive effect on ratings. 
Given the fact that insurance firms play a central role in fi-
ancial markets and are becoming more engaged with banks,
nalysing their insolvency risk is clearly important. Within insur-
nce firms, general insurers provide non-life insurance including
roperty cover, health insurance, liability policies and miscella-
eous financial loss cover for individual, firms and others. Unlike
ife insurers offering to individuals products such as annuities, con-
entional life insurance and other savings products, general insur-
nce firms have shorter-term liabilities and are more vulnerable.
ecause of the big difference between general insurance and life
nsurance firms, it is inappropriate to mix them together. In the
resent study, we employ a reduced-form model to assess the in-
olvency risk for general insurance firms in the case of the UK. 
. Data and covariates 
Firm-specific variables are collected from SynThesys Non-Life. 3 
his consists of FSA (now regulated under the Prudential Regu-
ation Authority, Bank of England) non-life annual return regula-
ory data. This database gives access to FSA return data for the3 From Standard & Poor’. 
I
(
Surrent year and past years back to 1985. Over 400 companies
re covered by the current SynThesys Non-Life system and the data
nclude statements of solvency, components of capital resources,
tatements of net assets, calculations of capital requirement, analy-
is of admissible assets, liabilities, the profit and loss account, anal-
sis of derivative contracts, summary of business carried on, tech-
ical account, analysis of premiums, analysis of claims, analysis of
xpenses, analysis of technical provisions etc. Also, approximately
80 ratios are included, with all the underlying calculations being
one by SynThesys . 
Since most general insurance firms are small and non-public,
here is no specific default list. Further, in the UK market, instead
f becoming insolvent, most general insurance firms go into ‘Run-
ff’ (i.e. stop underwriting new business and wait for their finan-
ial condition to improve or transfer their business to others). All
he credit events in our paper have been collected by hand from
ppendix D: Company Changes, Transfers, Mergers of SynThesys Non-
ife UserGuide version 10.1, 4 PwC - Insurance insolvency 5 and Finan-
ial Services Compensation Scheme , 6 and the final list 7 has been
urther discussed with technical specialists and senior supervisors
rom the Insurance Division at the Bank of England. Macroeco-
omic data have been obtained from the World Bank . Therefore,
urs is a unique dataset for the insurance industry in the UK. 
Before analysing the data, we remove firms without at least
ne-year balance data for all the variables. This is because such
rms cannot be used to calibrate the model. We also remove firms
or reasons such as merger and acquisitions or simply running off
nd disappearing. More discussion of the different types of firms’
xit can be found in the model section. In the end, we are left
ith 366 firms with 14 firm-specific variables and 6 macroeco-
omic variables in our dataset spanning from 1986 to 2014. They
nclude 35 firms that became insolvent during that period and 45
rms that exited owing to other reasons such as transferring their
usiness to other firms. 
To lessen the effect of outliers, we cap the reinsurance ratio and
everage ratio at the 95 percentile value and remove the lower 5
ercentile value. We also cap the liquidity ratio, profitability ra-
io, combined ratio, growth premium written change, claim change
nd excess capital ratio at the 99 percentile value and remove the
ower 1 percentile value. The summary statistics and correlation
atrix of firm-specific and macroeconomic variables respectively
re reported in Tables 1 –3 . 
.1. Covariates 
Following the literature, 8 we choose the following firm-specific
ariables: leverage (Net Technical Provisions /Adjust Liquid Assets,
ynThesys Appendix K: Ratio Definitions R12), profitability (under-
riting profit to Total Assets), growth (the change in the nat-
ral logarithm of total admissible assets), firm size (the natu-
al logarithm of total admitted assets), reinsurance (the ratio of
einsurance Premiums Ceded to Gross Premium written), claimsns, Metropolitan RE, Moorgate Ins, Nippon InsCo Europe, Polygon Ins UK, Swiss RE 
UK), Tower Ins Ukbr. 
8 Brotman (1989), Adams (1995), Pottier (1997, 1998 ), Adams et al. (2003) and 
hiu (2011) etc. 
110 G.M. Caporale et al. / Journal of Banking and Finance 84 (2017) 107–122 
Table 1 
Summary statistics – full sample. 
Maximum, minimum, median, average and standard deviation of firm- 
specific variables which including underwriting profit, leverage ratio, 
firm size, cash ratio, change of gross premium written, reinsurance ra- 
tio, change of incurred claims, growth ratio, change of excess capital, 
combined ratio, investment return and Herfindahl index of the whole 
industry. 
Max Min Median Average Std 
PT 0.308 −0.296 −0.006 −0.007 0.064 
Lev 4.692 −0.031 0.598 0.624 0.461 
Size 17.834 1.289 11.315 11.341 2.180 
CA 0.992 0.001 0.115 0.206 0.228 
GPW % 11.208 −3.393 0.030 0.077 0.928 
Rein 1.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.244 0.323 0.296 
Claim % 25.891 −6.844 0.027 0.227 1.954 
Growth 6.471 −9.448 0.009 0.017 0.413 
Excess % 8.740 −4.156 0.049 0.168 0.959 
Combined 326.0 0 0 0.032 0.481 5.436 25.757 
InvR 0.110 −0.038 0.028 0.031 0.022 
H-Index 1.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.763 0.714 0.280 
Table 2 
Summary statistics – default sample. 
Maximum, minimum, median, average and standard deviation of firm- 
specific variables which including underwriting profit, leverage ratio, 
firm size, cash ratio, change of gross premium written, reinsurance 
ratio, change of incurred claims, growth ratio, change of excess capi- 
tal, combined ratio, investment return and Herfindahl index of default 
firms. 
Max Min Median Average Std 
PT 0.288 −0.241 −0.018 −0.025 0.058 
Lev 4.626 −0.001 0.806 0.865 0.594 
Size 15.251 5.816 11.458 11.327 1.661 
CA 0.969 0.001 0.120 0.194 0.197 
GPW % 8.026 −3.393 −0.067 −0.098 0.946 
Rein 1.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.442 0.445 0.266 
Claim % 25.073 −6.044 0.009 0.089 1.763 
Growth 1.590 −1.417 −0.020 −0.009 0.285 
Excess % 6.971 −3.427 0.007 0.085 1.012 
Combined 285.200 0.037 0.554 8.142 29.902 
InvR 0.087 −0.034 0.020 0.023 0.019 
H-Index 1.0 0 0 0.185 0.785 0.731 0.260 
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10 The annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices is calculated using 
values in 2005 US dollars. 
11 Change of Wholesale Price Index (2010 = 100). The wholesale price index in- 
cludes a mix of agricultural and industrial goods at various stages of production 
and distribution, including import duties. 
12 Change of Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows. Foreign Direct Investment is 
defined as direct investment equity flows in the reporting economy. It is the sum 
of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other capital. Direct investment is 
a category of cross-border investment associated with a resident in one economy 
having control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an enter- 
prise that is resident in another economy. 
13 The real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as mea- 
sured by the GDP deflator. The terms and conditions attached to lending rates differ change (the change in net claims incurred), capital (the change
in excess capital resources to cover general business CRR), liq-
uidity (Cash/Total Asset: the ratio of the sum of cash and short-
term investments to total assets), gross premium written (the an-
nual change in gross premium written), combined ratio (Incurred
Claims + Management Expense) / Gross Premium Written), Line-
of-Business Concentration (Herfindahl index), organisational form
(mutual or non-mutual firm) and a derivative dummy variable (de-
fined on the basis of SynThesys form 17, 9 i.e. whether the sum of
form 17 is zero or not). In addition, we also include UK macroeco-
nomic variables, namely GDP growth, the change in the wholesale
price index (2010 = 100), the change in foreign direct investment,
net inflows, the real interest rate, the real effective exchange rate
index (2010 = 100) and the change in the credit provided by finan-
cial institutions (% of GDP), all series coming from the World Bank . 9 Our dataset does not allow to distinguish between exchange-traded and OTC 
derivatives. Using the information from form 17, it includes the following types of 
derivatives used: Fixed-interest securities; Futures & contracts for differences: In- 
terest rates; Futures & contracts for differences: Inflation; Futures & contracts for 
differences: Credit index/basket; Futures & contracts for differences: Credit single 
name; Futures & contracts for differences: Equity Index; Futures & contracts for dif- 
ferences: Equity Stock; Futures & contracts for differences: Land; Futures & con- 
tracts for differences: Currencies; Futures & contracts for differences: Mortality; Fu- 
tures & contracts for differences: Other; options: Swaptions; options: Equity index 
calls;options: Equity stock calls; options: Equity index puts; options: Equity stock 
puts; options: Options. 
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l.1.1. Traditional risk factors 
Traditional risk factors such as leverage, profitability, firm’s
rowth rate, firm size, and liquidity are also important for assess-
ng the insolvency risk of insurance firms. First, higher leverage
ay have an adverse effect on them by affecting their underwrit-
ng performance and making an insurer’s capital more vulnerable
o economic shocks. Further, Adams et al. (2003) find that insur-
rs with lower financial leverage are more likely to be given a
igher credit rating. Previous studies such as Brotman (1989) and
ottier (1997, 1998 ) also report a negative relationship between fi-
ancial leverage and the capital structure of insurance firms. Sec-
nd, profitability (in our case, we split it into underwriting prof-
tability and investment return) indicates the ability of insurance
rms to generate a surplus to develop their current business and
enerate new business. A higher profitability ratio means that an
nsurance firm can manage expenses effectively and set compet-
tive premium rates. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Frank and
oyal (2009) suggest that highly profitable firms have a lower
ebt ratio and hence a lower credit risk. Third, normally a posi-
ive firm’s growth rate signals a good financial condition of that
rm, but for issuers with significant new business growth could
e achieved by poor underwriting standards and mispricing strat-
gy ( Adams et al., 2003 ). Borde et al. (1994) and Pottier (1997) find
hat this will lead to greater uncertainty about the capital re-
erve risk for insurance firms. Further, Frank and Goyal (2009) con-
lude that firms with a high growth ratio face more debt-related
gency issues and higher associated cost. Fourth, studies such
s Bouzouita and Young (1998) find that large insurers are less
ikely to become insolvent; they normally benefit from economies
f scale, and given their sizeable market shares and higher rat-
ngs have lower financing costs than small insurers ( Adams et al.,
003 ). Fifth, we use the cash ratio as a measure of a firm’s liq-
idity. For insurance firms, a high liquidity ratio indicates good
laim-paying ability. Previous studies such as Carson and Scott
1997) and Bouzouita and Young (1998) show a negative correla-
ion between the liquidity risk and the credit rating of insurance
rms. 
In addition, some commonly used macroeconomic variables
uch as GDP growth, 10 Wholesale Price, 11 Foreign Direct Invest-
ent, 12 Real Interest Rate, 13 Real Effective Exchange Rate, 14 Credit
rovided by Financial Institutions 15 are also included in our model.y country, however, which limits their comparability. 
14 Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (2010 = 100). The real effective exchange rate 
s the nominal effective exchange rate (which measures the value of a currency 
gainst a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator 
r cost indexs. 
15 Change of Credit provided by Financial Institutions (% of GDP). Domestic credit 
rovided by the financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross ba- 
is, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The finan- 
ial sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other 
nancial corporations when data are available (including corporations that do not 
ccept transferable deposits but incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). 
xamples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, money 
enders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange companies. 
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix of firm-specific variables. 
Correlation matrix of underwriting profit, leverage ratio, firm size, cash ratio, change of gross premium written, reinsurance ratio, change of incurred 
claims, growth ratio, change of excess capital, combined ratio, investment return and Herfindahl index of the GI firms. 
PT Lev Size CA GPW % Rein Claim % Growth Excess % Combined InvR H-Index 
PT 1.0 0 0 −0.271 −0.078 0.084 −0.002 −0.074 −0.074 −0.008 0.094 −0.023 −0.098 0.129 
Lev −0.271 1.0 0 0 0.352 −0.203 −0.006 −0.081 0.022 0.012 −0.040 0.018 −0.052 −0.173 
Size −0.078 0.352 1.0 0 0 −0.417 −0.012 0.003 0.003 0.152 0.053 −0.074 −0.081 −0.456 
CA 0.084 −0.203 −0.417 1.0 0 0 0.054 −0.163 0.013 0.014 0.028 −0.006 0.161 0.178 
GPW % −0.002 −0.006 −0.012 0.054 1.0 0 0 −0.047 0.226 0.318 0.020 −0.092 0.005 −0.055 
Rein −0.074 −0.081 0.003 −0.163 −0.047 1.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 −0.039 −0.001 0.040 −0.325 −0.137 
Claim % −0.074 0.022 0.003 0.013 0.226 0.0 0 0 1.0 0 0 0.185 0.015 0.0 0 0 0.009 −0.003 
Growth −0.008 0.012 0.152 0.014 0.318 −0.039 0.185 1.0 0 0 0.253 −0.128 −0.046 −0.070 
Excess % 0.094 −0.040 0.053 0.028 0.020 −0.001 0.015 0.253 1.0 0 0 −0.019 −0.004 −0.005 
Combined −0.023 0.018 −0.074 −0.006 −0.092 0.040 0.0 0 0 −0.128 −0.019 1.0 0 0 −0.047 0.120 
InvR −0.098 −0.052 −0.081 0.161 0.005 −0.325 0.009 −0.046 −0.004 −0.047 1.0 0 0 −0.057 
H-Index 0.129 −0.173 −0.456 0.178 −0.055 −0.137 −0.003 −0.070 −0.005 0.120 −0.057 1.0 0 0 
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t  .1.2. Insurance-specific risk factors 
We also include insurance-specific factors such as reinsurance,
ncurred claims growth, capital, gross premium written growth, a
erivative dummy, organisational form, combined ratio, and line-
f-business concentration to capture the additional default risk in-
ormation within the insurance industry. 
First, reinsurance is widely used by insurance firms to reduce
apital requirements but makes them exposed to counterparty risk.
erger et al. (1992) point out that there are two types of tradi-
ional reinsurance activities involving a direct insurer ceding all or
art of its assumed underwritings to another insurance company.
nsurance firms transfer part of their risk to third parties by rein-
urance, which results in lower uncertainty concerning their future
osses and enables them to reduce their capital reserves. Adams
1996) suggests that reinsurance improves the ability of the pri-
ary insurer to survive an external economic shock. On the other
and, the financial health of a heavily reinsured firm will be ad-
ersely affected by the insolvency of reinsurance firms. It should
e noticed that the reinsurance firms discussed in Section 5 are
hose taking reinsurance from primary insurers. 
Second, claims’ growth 16 will directly affect the capital of an
nsurance firm. In the insurance industry, incurred claims are the
mount of outstanding liabilities for policies over a given valuation
eriod. A significant increase in net claims may generate liquid-
ty risk for an insurer, which will eventually become insolvent if it
annot raise enough capital. 
Third, the capital used to cover the insurance business is a key
actor. When measuring the default risk of insurance firms, it is
atural to include the Excess (deficiency) of capital resources to
over general business CRR (Capital Requirements Regulation). In-
urance firms should hold enough capital to cover the policies they
nderwrite. 
Fourth, the growth in the gross premium written reflects how
ell an insurance firm is running its core business; a rapidly
rowing gross premium written may indicate potential huge losses
claims) in the future. Generally speaking, an increase in gross pre-
ia written 17 indicates that the insurance firm is in a good finan-
ial condition. Incorporating this variable into the model will au-
omatically exclude ‘run-off’ firms from the sample; these are very
ommon in the insurance industry (insurance firms can stop un-
erwriting business but still exist for many years). 
Fifth, whether or not an insurance firm is involved in deriva-
ive trading will affect its credit risk; hence, we add a deriva-
ive dummy to our model. Shiu (2011) notes that insurers use16 The difference in annual incurred claims. 
17 These are the total premia written, which include both direct and assumed pre- 
ia written, before any reinsurance. 
t
a
t
perivatives to hedge risk, which may also increase their expo-
ure to counterparty risk (for OTCs). The dataset does not allow
o distinguish between OTC and exchange trade derivatives, but it
oes differentiate between derivatives for investment and hedg-
ng. Our data 18 are consistent with the findings of Shiu (2011) ,
ho reported that most insurers use derivatives for hedging pur-
oses, and therefore their insolvency could increase because of
hese hedging activities (i.e. counterparty risk from OTCs or mar-
et risk from imperfect hedging). Following his study, we ob-
ain label 1 for a derivative user by looking for nonzero values
rom Form 17 of the PRA returns. For example, if insurance firms
rade derivatives (in which case they report the derivatives us-
ge in form 17, and therefore the sum of form 17 will not be
ero) then the dummy takes value 1, otherwise it is set equal
o 0. 
Sixth, since most general insurance firms are not publicly listed,
rms with different organisational forms, including mutual and
on-mutual, can behave differently. Adams (1995) argued that the
rganisational form can partly affect the decision-making of insur-
nce firms. A mutual insurance firm is an organisation that sup-
lies insurance services, and that is owned by its customers, or
embers, which means that there are no shareholders to pay div-
dends to or to be accountable to. Such a firm can concentrate
ntirely on delivering products and services that best meet the
eeds of its customers. In our analysis we separate mutual and
on-mutual firms. 
Seventh, insurance firms writing more new business (i.e. with
ast growth in gross premium written) are normally in good
nancial health, but there is a potential mispricing problem
firms use a cheap premium to increase sales but do not gen-
rate enough money to cover future claims). This is captured by
he combined ratio in our model, which is defined as Incurred
laims + Management Expense) / Gross Premium Written to cap-
ure any mispricing by insurers. 
Lastly, insurance firms usually run business in different areas; if
he business is highly concentrated in a single area, this may lead
o huge losses. For example, an insurance firm focusing on proper-
ies will suffer a lot when floods or earthquakes happen. As a re-
ult, insurers with a high line-of-business concentration may have
 higher earning risk. We follow Shiu (2011) in using the Herfind-
hl index H at the firm level to proxy the line-of-business concen-
ration (a higher number indicates a lower level of business mix,18 We checked the data on derivatives for hedging and investment and noticed 
hat only 8 data-points correspond to trading derivatives for investment (i.e. insur- 
nce firms receive a fixed payment in exchange for taking risk). As a robustness 
est, we report the regression results in Appendix C when removing the 8 data- 
oints for investment; the results are consistent with our original results. 
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b  the max value is 1), which is defined as : 
H = 
N ∑ 
i =1 
S 2 i (1)
where s i is the premium written for business line i as a percent-
age of the Gross Premium Written (i.e. divided by the total pre-
mium written for all business lines), and N represents the number
of different types of business lines in which the firms are involved.
3.2. Summary statistics 
As already pointed out, the insurance industry is relatively more
stable than other industries. This is confirmed by Table 1 , which
shows that the standard deviation (Std) of underwriting profitabil-
ity (PT) and investment return (InvR) is very small. 19 
Insurance firms, on average, have a higher investment profit
than the traditional underwriting profit. 20 This could be driven by
derivative trading ( Schinasi, 2006 ; Rule, 2001 ). On average, general
insurance firms in the UK have high capitalisation, the reason be-
ing that they have to comply with more rigorous capital require-
ments than financial institutions ( Harrington, 2009 ). The size of
firms changes a lot over the sample period that we are considering,
suggesting that, although the industry as a whole is relatively sta-
ble, many insurance firms transfer their business to others before
they become insolvent. 21 This is also why we consider the transfer
of business to other companies as a possible form of exit. The high
volatility of the combined ratio (Combined) could be due to mis-
pricing problems. The Herfindahl index is 0.714 on average, with
a small standard deviation. This further supports the view that in-
surance firms are stable and their business is not very diverse. 
Table 2 shows that, over the full sample, on average default
firms have a negative underwriting profit (PT) and change in gross
premium written (GPW %), a low cash ratio (CA), a small incurred
claim increase (Claim %), a small excess capital increase (Excess %)
and a low investment return (InvR). This may indicate that they
lose money from their main business and their investment perfor-
mance is not as good as in the case of other firms. They are rela-
tively small-size firms with slow business growth, and holding less
capital makes them more vulnerable. They also have higher lever-
age, reinsurance ratio, combined ratio and Herfindahl index (H-
index), which suggests that they are more exposed to interest risk,
credit risk and market risk. Overall, the evidence in Table 2 con-
firms the previous findings of the literature (see, e.g., Adams et al.,
2003 and Shiu, 2011 ). 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the 12 firm-specific
variables. No evidence of high correlations is found for any firm-
specific variables; the maximum correlation is below 0.5. Under-
writing profitability (PT) is negatively correlated to leverage (Lev)
and the reinsurance ratio with a value of −0.271. This suggests that
financing activities through debt and reinsurance may reduce prof-
its. Another interesting finding is the negative correlation between
PT and investment return; this supports our variable analysis in
the previous section that splits profitability into core business (un-
derwriting business) and investment activities. 
Firm size has a positive relationship with leverage (Lev) but a
negative one with the cash ratio (CA), which indicates that large
firms are relatively more leveraged and hold less cash. 19 Compared to banks, insurers do not face the risk of a ‘bank run’ and claiming 
payments from them normally takes longer than withdrawing cash from banks. 
20 Investing in high-risk portfolios may yield higher returns than the normal un- 
derwriting business. 
21 To protect the interests of policy-holders, insurance firms are more likely to 
stop writing new business or transfer their business to other firms rather than be- 
coming insolvent. 
w
q  
w  
n  
f  
fi  Gross premium written has a positive relationship with both
rm’s growth (0.318) and claims change (0.226). This suggests that
f insurers write more premiums this will lead to a fast growth
f the firm, but one should also take into account the potential
ash outflows from large potential claims in future. It is important
herefore for the model to capture mispricing problems by incor-
orating the combined ratio that is typical of firms growing rapidly
nd writing more business. 
Finally, firm size and the Herfindahl index (H-index) are nega-
ively correlated with a value of −0.456, which suggests that large
rms have a relatively less concentrated business. 
. The model 
Default risk modelling has developed considerably in recent
ears. Beaver (1966, 1968) and Altman (1968) first proposed credit
coring models that calculate the default probability for a firm us-
ng accounting-based variables. The structural model, first used by
erton (1974) , applies option theory to derive the value of a firm’s
iabilities in the event of default. 
There are several issues arising in the context of such models.
stimating the probability of default on the basis of accounting
ata amounts to trying to predict a future event using financial
tatements designed to capture the past performance of a firm;
herefore, the obtained estimates might not have strong predic-
ive power about the future status of the firm. Also, Hillegeist et
l. (2004) find that, owing to the conservatism principle, fixed as-
ets and intangibles are sometimes undervalued relative to their
arket prices causing accounting-based leverage measures to be
verstated. As for the structural model, the value of a firm’s assets
s estimated at market prices; however, these may not contain all
ublicly available default-related information on the firm. Also, the
erm structure, off-balance and other liabilities are not well spec-
fied in structural models when calculating the default threshold
f the firm, which may lead to inaccurate estimates of the default
robability. 
For these reasons, in this paper instead we estimate default
robabilities using reduced-form models that have become in-
reasingly popular for individual firms in recent years. Jarrow and
urnbull (1995) first introduced this type of models, which were
hen extended by Duffie and Singleton (1999) . They assume that
xogenous Poisson random variables drive the default probability
f a firm. A firm will default when the exogenous variables shift
rom their normal levels. The stochastic process in the model is not
irectly linked to the firm’s assets value. This makes the models
ore tractable. Duffie et al. (2007) first proposed a doubly stochas-
ic Poisson model with time-varying covariates and then forecast
he evolution of covariate processes using Gaussian panel vector
utoregressions. The model was further developed by Duan et al.
2012) , who applied a pseudo-likelihood method to derive the for-
ard intensity rate of the doubly stochastic Poisson processes at
ifferent time horizons. 
The Poisson process with stochastic intensities has been widely
pplied to model default events. The specification adopted in this
aper assumes that the stochastic intensity has a linear relation-
hip with macroeconomic and firm-specific variables. A doubly-
tochastic formulation of the point process for default is proposed
y Duffie et al. (2007) , with the conditional probability of default
ithin τ years being given by 
 ( X t , τ ) = E 
(∫ t+ τ
t 
e −
∫ z 
t ( λ( u ) + ϕ ( u ) ) du λ( z ) dz| X t 
)
(2)
here X t is the Markov state vector of firm-specific and macroeco-
omic covariates, and λt (the conditional mean arrival rate of de-
ault measured in events per year) is a firm’s default intensity. The
rm may exit for other reasons, such as merger and acquisition or
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s  ransfer of business to other firms, in which case the intensity is
efined as ϕt . Thus the total exit intensity is ϕ t + λt . 
The forward default intensity is given by: 
f t ( τ ) =exp 
(
α0 ( τ ) + α1 ( τ ) X t, 1 + α2 ( τ ) X t, 2 + . . . + αk ( τ ) X t,k 
)
(3) 
nd the forward combined exit intensity is defined as: 
 t ( τ ) = f t ( τ ) + exp 
(
β0 ( τ ) 
+ β1 ( τ ) X t, 1 + β2 ( τ ) X t, 2 + . . . + βk ( τ ) X t,k 
)
(4) 
We use the pseudo-likelihood function derived by Duan et al.
2012) to estimate the forward default intensity. The details of the
erivation of its large sample properties can be found in Appendix
 of Duan et al.’s (2012) paper. In short, the pseudo-likelihood
unction for the prediction time τ is defined as 
 τ ( α, β; τC , τD , X ) = 
N ∏ 
i =1 
T −1 ∏ 
t=0 
L τ,i,t ( α, β) , (5) 
Our sample period goes from 0 to T and the frequency is an-
ual. Firm i first appears in the sample at t 0 i and τDi is the default
ime while τ Ci is the combined exit time. During the sample pe-
iod, if firm i exits because of default, then τDi = τ Ci , otherwise
Ci < τDi . As previously explained, X it are the covariates including
ommon factors and firm-specific variables. The prediction horizon
is measured in years with t = 1 , and α and β are the model
arameter sets for default and other exit processes, respectively. 
According to the doubly stochastic assumption (also known as
he conditional independence assumption), firms’ default probabil-
ties only depend on common factors and firm-specific variables
nd are independent from each other, i.e. the default of one firm
ill not influence other firms’ exit probabilities. 
The likelihood function L τ, i , t ( α, β) allows for five possible cases
or firm i : in the prediction time period it can survive, default, 22 
xit for other reasons (which in our sample means that the insur-
nce firm transferred its business to other firms); it can also exit
fter or before the prediction time period: 
 τ,i,t ( α, β) = 1 { t 0 i ≤t , τCi ≥t + τ} P t ( τCi > t + τ ) 
+ 1 { t 0 i ≤t , τDi = τCi ≤t + τ} P t ( τCi ; τDi = τCi ≤ t + τ ) 
+ 1 { t 0 i ≤t, τDi  = τCi , τCi ≤t+ τ} P t ( τCi ; τDi  = τCi , τCi ≤ t + τ ) 
+ 1 { t 0 i >t } + 1 { t Ci <t } (6) 
here 
 t ( τCi > t + τ ) = exp 
[ 
−
τ−1 ∑ 
s =0 
g it ( s ) t 
] 
 t ( τCi ; τDi = NG τCi ≤ t + τ ) 
 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
1 − exp [ − f it ( 0 ) t ] , when τCi = t + 1 
exp 
[
−
τCi −t−2 ∑ 
s =0 
g it ( s ) t 
]
∗ { exp [ − f it ( C it − t − 1 ) t ] − exp [ −g i
when t + 1 < τCi ≤ t + τ
 t ( τCi ; τDi  = τCi , & τCi ≤ t + τ ) 
 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
exp [ − f it ( 0 ) t ] − exp [ −g it ( 0 ) t ] , when τCi = t + 1 
exp 
[
−
τCi −t−2 ∑ 
s =0 
g it ( s ) t 
]
∗ { exp [ − f it ( τCi − t − 1 ) t ] − exp [ −g it
when t + 1 < τCi ≤ t + τ
The pseudo-likelihood function L τ,i,t ( α, β) can be maximised
umerically to obtain the estimated parameters ˆ α and ̂  β . Owing22 Default events are collected from SynThesys Non-Life and include insolvent, in 
iquidation, placed in administration and dissolved. 
p  
s  
F  
m  − t − 1 ) t ] } , 
⎫ ⎪ ⎬ ⎪ ⎭ 
− t − 1 ) t ] } , 
⎫ ⎪ ⎬ ⎪ ⎭ 
o the overlapping nature of this function, the inference is not im-
ediately clear. For example, at time t 5 and the prediction hori-
on τ = 2 , firm A ‘s default over the 2-year period starting 1 year
head ( t 4 to t 6 ) will be correlated with firm’s B default in the next
ime period ( t 6 in this case). 
In addition, the pseudo-likelihood function can be decomposed
nto default and other exit processes which contain parameter sets
and β respectively, and each process can be further decomposed
nto different prediction horizon τ . As a result, the estimates ˆ α
nd ̂  β can be obtained at the same time. 
 τ ( α( s ) ) = 
N ∏ 
i =1 
T −s −1 ∏ 
t=0 
L i,t ( α( s ) ) , s = 0 , 1 , . . . , τ − 1 (7) 
 τ ( β( s ) ) = 
N ∏ 
i =1 
T −s −1 ∏ 
t=0 
L i,t ( β( s ) ) , s = 0 , 1 , . . . , τ − 1 . (8) 
. Empirical results 
.1. Estimations results 
In our model, the logarithm of forward default intensity has a
inear relationship with the covariates: 
t ( τ ) = α0 ( τ ) + α1 ( τ ) X t, 1 + α2 ( τ ) X t, 2 + . . . + αk ( τ ) X t,k . 
X t, k includes the following factors: GDP growth, real interest
ate, real exchange rate, FDI, wholesale price change, underwrit-
ng profit, leverage, firm size, cash ratio, gross premium written
hange, reinsurance, incurred claims change, firm’s growth, excess
apital change, investment return, combined ratio, Herfindahl in-
ex, derivative dummy and organisational form. All covariates are
agged up to 3 years. For example, in the case of the one-year de-
ault prediction, all covariates are lagged by one year. 
Table 4 shows the main estimation results based on the full
ample going from 1985 to 2014. Other exit (i.e. transferring busi-
ess to others) outputs can be found in Appendix ( Table A.1 . The
riginal Solvency I Directive 73/239/EEC was amended by direc-
ive 2002/13/EC (non-life insurance) and became effective at the
tart of 2004. The policy changes were small (the absolute mini-
um amount of capital required has been increased and will be
ndexed in the future in line with inflation, whilst the method of
alculating the required solvency margin remains essentially the
ame). However, the thresholds have been increased, and so has
he power of supervisory bodies to intervene early to take remedial
ction when the interests of policy-holders are threatened. There-
ore, as a robustness check, we also estimate the model over the
ubsample from 1985 to 2003; the results can be found in Ap-
endix ( Table B.1 ). In brief, most results stay the same, except that
ome macroeconomic variables such as the real exchange rate and
DI become significant owing to changes in the economic environ-
ent. Concerning firm-specific variables, claims change becomes
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Table 4 
Estimations results. 
Coefficients of constant, GDP growth, real interest rate, real ex- 
change rate, foreign direct investment %, whole sale price %, credit 
provided by financial institutions %, underwriting profit, leverage, 
size, cash ratio, gross premium written %, reinsurance, incurred 
claims %, growth, excess capital, combined ratio, investment return, 
Herfindahl index, derivative dummy and organisational form based 
on full sample from 1985 to 2014. The model estimates the multi- 
period (up to 3 years’ horizon) default probability of GI firms. In 
the following analysis, we calculate the default probability based 
on 1-year prediction. The values in parentheses in the table are 
the standard deviations. 
Horizon 1 2 3 
Parameters 
C −15.952 ∗∗∗ −24.965 −37.863 
(5.312) (76.082) (31.626) 
GDP_growth −0.053 0.041 0.116 
(0.053) (0.489) (0.214) 
Real_IR 0.164 ∗∗∗ 0.284 ∗∗ 0.145 
(0.043) (0.133) (0.165) 
Real_EXrate 0.004 0.010 0.019 
(0.009) (0.209) (0.075) 
FDI % 0.020 −0.159 −0.121 
(0.073) (0.679) (0.248) 
Wholesale price % 12.367 ∗∗∗ 16.385 25.995 
(4.708) (50.366) (22.396) 
Credit by financial % −3.641 ∗∗∗ −0.291 −0.247 
(1.045) (0.465) (0.925) 
PT −3.781 ∗∗∗ −3.745 −3.740 
(1.264) (15.976) (10.250) 
Lev 0.523 ∗∗∗ 0.551 0.551 
(0.104) (1.552) (0.818) 
Size 0.009 0.028 0.115 
(0.050) (0.453) (0.185) 
CA 1.027 ∗∗∗ 1.049 −0.456 
(0.320) (1.829) (0.907) 
GPW % −0.789 ∗∗∗ −0.565 −0.077 
(0.121) (0.619) (0.100) 
Rein 0.822 ∗∗∗ 1.118 1.544 
(0.237) (4.185) (2.698) 
Claim % −0.023 −0.061 0.024 
(0.024) (0.237) (0.047) 
Growth 0.025 0.118 0.021 
(0.118) (0.906) (1.134) 
Eecess % −0.388 ∗∗∗ −0.450 −0.217 
(0.127) (0.332) (0.233) 
InvR −30.642 ∗∗∗ −21.029 −2.692 
(4.766) (161.676) (85.657) 
Combined ratio 0.003 ∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.004 ∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Herfindahl index 0.397 0.763 1.759 ∗∗∗
(0.408) (1.646) (0.542) 
Derivative dummy 0.627 ∗ 0.161 0.250 
(0.336) (1.764) (0.946) 
Organisational form 0.970 ∗∗∗ 0.551 0.621 
(0.310) (1.985) (0.822) 
Log-likelihood −508.2668 
No. of observations 5022 
∗ Significant at 10%. 
∗∗ Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%. 
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23 In the UK, the Bank of England has been collecting quarterly data for more than 
2 years; in the very near future, new data could be used in the model with multi- 
period prediction. 
24 ‘Business Activitiy’ in Adam et al. (2003) . 
25 This could be due to the different datasets used. Ours covers 366 general insur- 
ance firms and data from 1985 to 2014. Adam et al. (2003) instead only consider 
40 firms rated by A.M. Best plus 25 firms rated by S&P and include both general 
insurance and life insurance firms into the model. significant while the combined ratio and organisational form be-
come insignificant. These are plausible findings since in the early
years of the sample most firms were mutual firms, and therefore
the organisational form does not matter. The results also suggest
that mispricing (i.e. the combined ratio) is not the main reason for
insolvency. Not surprisingly, the claims change variable is signifi-
cant since natural disasters caused huge damage in the early 90s
and more claims are one of the most important factors increasing
the default probability of insurers. 
Table 4 shows the results for the sample periods 1985 to 2014
with 1, 2, and 3 year horizons. Clearly, the annual data in ourample are not useful for predicting over periods longer than 1
ear. However, the multi-period design of the model may be use-
ul when high-frequency data are used - for example, for analysing
ublicly listed insurance firms. This also suggests that central
anks should ask firms to submit data more frequently for better
upervision. 23 
Next, we analyse the results based on the 1-year prediction.
ost of them are in line with those of Adam et al. (2003) . Lever-
ge, underwriting profit, liquidity, reinsurance and organisational
orm 24 are significant factors both for assessing the insolvency risk
f insurance firms and determining the quality of credit rating. On
he other hand, firm size and growth are not significant. 25 Fur-
her, we find that macroeconomic and firm-specific factors (the
hange of credit provided by financial institutions, wholesale price
hange, investment profitability, combined ratio, and the usage of
nancial derivatives) are also important, and therefore should not
e neglected. To our knowledge this is the first study document-
ng their key role in determining the insolvency risk of insurance
rms. 
Concerning macroeconomic variables, the real interest rate and
he change in wholesale prices have a positive effect on default in-
ensity that could lead to a higher default probability (PD). As for
rm-specific variables, writing profitability and investment prof-
tability are negatively correlated with default intensity. This sug-
ests that high profitable firms are less likely to become insolvent.
urther, our results are consistent with those of Titman and Wes-
els (1988), Frank and Goyal (2009), Carson and Scott (1997) and
ouzouita and Young (1998) , who show that higher liquidity is as-
ociated with a higher credit rating. Therefore, firms holding more
apital tend to have higher liquidity and a lower default probabil-
ty. Moreover, the one-year PD shows that writing more premiums
ill lower an insurer’s default probability. Firms with larger gross
remium written will not only have cash inflows in the short term
ut also potential claims in the long term. The rapid growth of
ross premium written may also have caused the mispricing prob-
em (i.e. selling more policies at a cheap price - this is captured
y the combined ratio) and the increase in the default probability
f insurers. Finally, highly leveraged firms are less likely to survive
uring recessions and therefore normally have a higher PD. 
There are also three more interesting findings. First, in general,
arge firms typically have a good reputation and therefore it is eas-
er for them to obtain credit in the market. Bouzouita and Young
1998) find that large insurers are less likely to default. Our results
uggest that firm size is not a significant determinant of the sol-
ency of insurance firms. 
Second, ad hoc structured reinsurance may reduce the credit
isk exposure - for example, Adams (1996) shows that reinsurance
mproves the ability of the primary insurer to survive an external
conomic shock. However, we find a positive relationship between
einsurance and PD, which suggests that heavily reinsured firms
re more likely to default. Insurers transfer part or all of their risk
o other insurers through reinsurance and release capital reserves;
n this way they have resources to write new business. Insurers are
xposed to the counterparty risk of reinsures (e.g. when reinsurers
re insolvent or run off, insurers will have to pay the claims to the
olicy-holders) and their fast-growing business may lead to higher
otential losses in the future. 
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Fig. 1. PD of all firms. This figure plots the one-year default probability of all GI firms (straight line) and survival firms (dash line) from 1986 to 2014. We first predict the 
default probability of individual firms based on the parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we calculate the median default probability given a 
state (active firms or survival firms) for each year. 
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26 1990: The Burns’ Day storm happened on 25-26 January 1990 across North- 
Western Europe and was one of the strongest European windstorms. It hit during 
the daytime and caused huge damage. There was severe flooding in England and 
insurers in the UK lost £3.37bn; it was the UK’s most expensive weather event 
for insurers.1990-1991: There was an extremely cold winter in Western Europe. 
In the UK snow began to fall on the night of 7 December 1990 in the Midlands, 
Wales and the Pennines. Transport was severely disrupted and many people were 
trapped in their cars; moreover, there were power losses in many areas across the 
UK, and heavy rains and severe gales around Christmas and the New Year caused 
great damage to thousands of homes. There was more heavy snow in early Febru- 
ary 1991 during the coldest winter since 1987. Temperatures stayed very low until 
20 February.1998 Easter floods: Heavy rain started to fall on 9 April in the Midlands 
and then moved northwards causing severe floods. Thousands of housed were af- 
fected. 20 0 0: Severe flooding across the UK.2007: Floods affected Gloucestershire, 
Yorkshire, Hull and Worcestershire and caused £6 million damage.2008: Morpeth 
floods. There was flooding in the Midlands and North East England. £40 million 
damage.20 09: In February 20 09 heavy snow in the UK resulted in £1.3 billion dam- 
age. In November 2009 heavy rain caused flooding in many areas across the UK. 
2012: Great Britain and Ireland floods: most of UK experienced droughts in March, 
which was followed by the wettest April in 100 years. Heavy rains continued till 
July and resulted in flooding across the country. Widespread flooding and wind 
damage occurred in September, November, December, and January 2013. 2013: St. 
Jude storm; in October 2013 storms and strong winds (up to 160km/h) hit the south 
of England and Wales. East Coast Tidal Surge: in December 2013 strong northerly 
winds caused a large tidal surge which resulted in severe flooding of the coastal ar- 
eas. 2013–14: United Kingdom winter floods: from December 2013 to February 2014 
the south of England and Wales were hit by heavy rains and storms that caused 
flooding, power cuts and disruptions to transport. Third, one important question is whether using derivatives in-
reases the counterparty risk or is only useful for hedging. For
xample, derivatives could be used for hedging risk, but Shiu
2011) shows that this could also increase the exposure to coun-
erparty risk. Our findings indicate that the use of derivatives may
ncrease the probability of a firm becoming insolvent. This has im-
ortant implications for assessing risk in this industry. 
.2. Overall probability of default for the general insurance industry 
In this section, we estimate the default probabilities for all ac-
ive firms as well as the survival firms. This is in fact the first study
sing historical default risk for all active firms based on their indi-
idual PD. We also consider the performance of insurance firms
uring natural disasters and financial distress times (that is, at
imes when insurers are vulnerable and more likely to default).
ig. 1 below shows the probability of default for the General In-
urance industry from 1986 to 2014. The PDs are calculated using
he full-sample parameter estimates. 
Figs. 1 and 2 show that the PD of insolvent firms is much
igher and fluctuates more compared to the whole GI industry.
he highest PD of insolvent firms is about 0.07, which is almost
ix times that of the whole industry. For the GI industry, the PD
eaks around the early 90s and then decreases until 20 0 0; it is rel-
tively low but increased sharply in 2008, at the time of the global
nancial crisis. The PD of insolvent firms peaks around 1990 and
hen decreases until 1996. There are two spikes in 20 0 0 and 20 03,
efore the 2008 global financial crisis. The average PD for default
rms is 365 bps and 118 bps for the whole industry (97 bps for
urvival firms). The standard deviation for default firms is 0.0378,
hich is much higher than for the whole industry (0.0253) and
or survival firms (0.0230). In general, default firms are more risky
ompared to the whole GI industry. These results indicate that, un-
ike banks, GI firms are more sensitive to natural disasters than a
lobal financial crisis. 
Fig. 3 shows a large PD spread between insolvent firms and
he whole GI industry during the early 90s and a sharp rise in0 0 0 and 2003. It is generally positive before 2010, and it increases
apidly during the financial crisis, which indicates that all insol-
ent firms faced a worse financial situation and are more vulner-
ble than the whole GI industry. After 2008 it is much smaller or
ven negative. 
To sum up, the default probability of the General Insurance
ndustry varies over time and the PD of insolvent firms is more
olatile than that of the survival firms. High PDs are usually found
hen there are disasters such as floods 26 ; this indicates that, un-
ike other financial institutions, insurance firms are relatively sta-
le but very sensitive to natural disasters. The high PDs around the
ime of the 2008 financial crisis suggest that the insurance and
anking industries may be closely correlated (further research is
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Fig. 2. PD of insolvent firms. This figure plots the one-year default probability of GI firms from 1986 to 2014. We first predict the default probability of individual firm based 
on the parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we calculate the median default probability of all insolvent firms for each year. 
Fig. 3. PD spread between default and survival firms. This figure plots the one-year default probability of survival firms and the spread between survival and default firms 
from 1986 to 2014. We first predict the default probability of individual firm based on the parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we calculate 
the average default probability given a state (insolvent firms or survival firms) for each year. The spread is calculated as the median PD of insolvent firms minus that of 
survival firms. 
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t  needed on this issue, which is beyond the scope of the present pa-
per). Regulators should consider these interactions and be aware of
the contagion effect in distress times. 
5.3. Probability of default for different business lines 
In general, insurance firms have business in different sectors
and firms may change their main business line over time. In addi-
tion to business concentration, the change in the credit risk in dif-
ferent sectors has also important implication for the regulators’ su-ervision and policy-making decisions. This crucial issue has been
verlooked in the literature. Here we extend the credit risk analy-
is to the insurance firms’ business lines. 
On the basis of the gross premium written by each firm for dif-
erent business lines, we classify insurance firms into 7 groups: 1.
ccident & Health; 2. Motor; 3. Marine, Aviation & Goods in Tran-
it; 4. Third-party Liability; 5. Financial Loss; 6. Household& Do-
estic All risks and Property; 7. Miscellaneous. 
Around 1991, when natural disasters happened frequently, Mo-
or has the highest default probability, with Accident & Health
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Fig. 4. PD of 7 groups. This figure plots the one-year default probability which is decomposed to 7 groups’ PD from 1986 to 2014. We first predict the default probability of 
individual firm based on the parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we take the median default probability given a business line (accident & 
health; motor; marine, aviation & goods in transit; third-party liability; financial loss; household & domestic all risks and property; miscellaneous) for each year. 
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28 The default correlations are estimated by calculating the pair PD correlations aving the second highest. Third-party Liability has the third high-
st, Household & Domestic All Risk and Property and Marine, Avi-
tion & Goods in Transit have a slightly lower PDs, financial loss
as the lowest. After 1991, the PDs of all groups are decreasing,
hile until 1996, the PDs are fluctuating around their average. The
Ds of most groups exhibit an upward trend during the 2008 fi-
ancial crisis, the exceptions being Accident & Health as well as
iscellaneous, which are relatively flat. Among all groups, the Fi-
ancial Loss has the highest PD. After the financial crisis, Financial
oss and Marine, Aviation & Goods in Transit become the riskiest
roups ( Figs. 4 and 5 ). 
Insurance firms are generally very vulnerable when natural dis-
sters happen. Decomposing the PD of the insurance industry into
ifferent business lines reveals clear differences around the early
0s. Accident & Health, Household, Property, Motor, Transportation
nd Third-party Liability are the riskiest businesses because they
re more likely to be exposed to catastrophes such as floods, earth-
uakes etc. However, the PDs of all business lines have the same
pward trend in distress times except Accident & Health and Mis-
ellaneous that are less correlated with the financial market. These
ndings suggest that regulators might want to consider the varying
omposition of the premium written by insurance firms when set-
ing capital requirements. This forward-looking PD could give su-
ervisors at the central bank a warning sign of a risky business,
nd under Solvency II the central bank could take action, for in-
tance requiring firms to provide an additional buffer before they
reach their MCR (minimum capital requirement) and SCR (sol-
ency capital requirement). 27 
.4. Default clustering and systemic risk 
Since most insurance firms are non-public firms with a short
istory, very few of them are rated by credit rating agencies (e.g.
oody’s, S&P, Fitch and A&M Best). Adam et al. (2003) analyse27 The SCR and MCR act as trigger points in the ‘supervisory ladder of interven- 
ion’ introduced by Solvency II. 
a
w
f
m5 non-life and life firms rated by A.M. Best and S&P, while our
ample includes more than 300 GI firms. Using the estimation re-
ults from our model (see Table 4 ), we calculate PDs for all avail-
ble firms (see Eq. (2 )). We then extend the analysis to investi-
ate the joint default risk. We compute pair correlations 28 of firms
or different quantiles, and use the median value to obtain the de-
ault correlations. Previous studies such as Das et al. (2007) find
trong default correlations among corporate obligors. It is interest-
ng to establish whether insurance firms are likely to default jointly
hen their individual PDs are high. Also, high PD correlations may
uggest that insurers are affected by common factors beside firm-
pecific factors. 
We calculate the average pair PD correlations of all firms within
ifferent groups (from low risk 0% −20% to high risk 80% −100%)
ased on data for the period 1985–2014. The highest PD correla-
ions are found in the 0% −20% quantile, and the second highest in
he 20% −40%. The fact that the highest correlation is that between
nsurers with the lowest PD suggests that when insurance firms
re less exposed to risk there is a more important role for com-
on factors, in our case macroeconomic factors such as the credit
upply and wholesale price changes. Insurers within the highest
0% −100% quantile have the third highest PD correlation, which
ndicates that their credit risk is affected by both common and
rm-specific factors. The observed pattern for PD correlations for
ifferent quantiles supports our choice of considering macroeco-
omic factors as well as firm-specific factors. Overall, our empir-
cal results are in line with those of Bell and Keller (2009) , who
how that insurers are less interconnected than banks and there is
 lower contagion effect among them. The PDs for the 20% quan-
ile has the highest correlation (0.2111). The lowest correlation is
0.0170, while the PD correlation for the group ‘40%–60%’ is muchcross firms in each quantile. A similar approach is taken by Duan and Miao (2016) , 
ho estimate the joint default probability on the basis of the individual firm’s de- 
ault probability that has been obtained first using the doubly stochastic Poisson 
odel. 
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Fig. 5. PD of 7 groups. This figure plots the one-year default probability of 7 groups: Accident & Health, Motor, Marine, Aviation & Goods in transit, Third-party liability, 
Financial Loss, Household & Domestic all risks and property, and Miscellaneous from 1986 to 2014. We first predict the default probability of individual firm based on the 
parameters estimated by the doubly stochastic Poisson model. Then we take the median default probability for a given business line for each year. 
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ahigher ( −0.0095), and the PD correlation for the group ‘20%–40%’ is
slightly higher (0.1233). The ‘80% −100%’ group has the third largest
PD correlation (0.0315); this points to some default clustering. The
highest PD correlation is found for the group ‘0% −20%’, which sug-
gests that in safe times most insurance firms are in a good finan-
cial situation. Overall, the results imply that systemic risk within
general insurance firms is low. 
5.5. Reinsurance and default risk 
Reinsurance is a pure hedging contract that enables primary
insurers to transfer risks to third parties (i.e. reinsurers receive
a share of annual premia written from primary insurers to com-
pensate them for potential loss events). Previous papers show that
corporate hedging decisions such as reinsurance affect the strate-
gic performance of firms ( Harris and Raviv, 1991; Adam et al.,
2007 ). Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) highlight that indemnity
contracts such as reinsurance contracts are pure hedging instru-
ments. Harrington and Niehaus (2003) argue that reinsurance is
important because solvency risk matters to both policy holders and
regulators. Upreti and Adam (2015) find that reinsurance enables
primary insurers to have sufficient risk capacity for planning and
pricing new business lines. Therefore, insurers can be exposed to
new risks through risk financing as well as reinsuring activities. 
As already discussed, insurers with a high reinsurance ratio
usually also have a high PD. Therefore the counterparty risk of
reinsurance will increase the insolvency risk of primary insurers,
and not surprisingly, under Solvency II, reinsurance assets 29 are
listed separately from cash and financial assets in an insurance
firm’s balance sheet; also, technical provision (i.e. provisions for
expected future claims) of reinsurance has been incorporated into
Solvency II as part of liabilities. Reinsurance activities link differ-
ent insurers together and represent a contagion channel in the
system in distress times; consequently, the performance of rein-
surance firms (firms buying reinsurance) is very important for the
whole general insurance industry. 29 Reinsurance assets here refers to ceded reinsurance assets that are by definition 
only those of the cedant associated with ceded reinsurance contracts. bNext, we investigate the performance of firms when they use
he reinsurance market. We first classify them into different groups
ased on the percentage of reinsurance they accept relative to their
otal written gross premium, and then we analyse the credit spread
f firms who accepted reinsurance across the different groups. 
Reinsurance firms play a crucial role in the general insurance
arket. The orange line in Fig. 6 shows that the percentage of
rms in each size group changes over time. The total percentage
f firms accepting reinsurance peaked in 1988 and decreased af-
erwards. Most firms accept less than 20% reinsurance, and this
ercentage has been decreasing since 1987. Less than 50% of firms
ave accepted 20% to 80% reinsurance, most of the time, in the
ast 30 years. There are more than 15% of firms in the upper
0% group between 1996 and 2005, when this percentage peaked.
he maximum spreads for each group are 67 bps, 111 bps, 66 bps,
02 bps, 40 bps, and 38 bps, respectively, and their standard devia-
ions 0.0 017, 0.0 031, 0.0 022, 0.0 032, 0.0 018, and 0.0 011. For each
roup, we calculate the credit spread between firms accepting
einsurance and firms not accepting it. 
Fig. 6 shows that the lowest 20% firms have a negative spread
n most periods, except during the early 90s, vis-à-vis the firms
hat do not use the reinsurance market. This may indicate that
rms that are less involved with the reinsurance market often have
ood creditworthiness and take reinsurance as part of their busi-
ess plan. 30 By contrast, firms accepting 20% to 40% reinsurance
an have either positive or negative spreads at different points in
ime in the sample period. During the financial crisis, their spread
is-à-vis firms not accepting reinsurance is positive. For the group
f firms accepting between 40% to 60% and 60% to 80% reinsur-
nce, the spread is positive most of the time, except during the
0s. Finally, for the group accepting more than 80% reinsurance the
pread peaked during the early 90s (at the time of the Burns’ Day
torm), and became relatively small during the financial crisis, and
ven negative ( −0.0016) in 2008. This may reflect the fact that,
or the pure reinsurance firms, their risk management strategy is
imed at reducing potential losses during distress times. 30 Through reinsurance, firms will have less liability, fewer reserves requirement, 
ut release more capital to write new business or investment in other products. 
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Fig. 6. Credit spread when taking Reinsurance. Credit spread between firms accepting reinsurance and firms not accepting reinsurance at different levels (full sample 
calibration). Orange line: percentage of firms with reinsurance accepted at certain level; black stack: credit spread. 
 
i  
y  
T  
d  
t
 
2  
t  
0  
F  
a  
h  
(  
a  
u  
s  
n
 
h  
m  
e  
d  
i
 
o  
t  
p  
r  
o  
f  
a  
t  
p  
v  
6
 
fi  
f  
t  
m  
p  
s  
s  
v  
p  
t  
T
 
b  
a  
fi  
L  
c  
u  
q  
t  
l
 
f  
l  
r  
m  
i  
p  
m  
tIn our sample, for all firms taking reinsurance (group 0% −100%
n Fig. 6 ) compared to firms not taking reinsurance, there are 19
ears with a positive spread, and 10 years with a negative one.
he results imply that firms accepting reinsurance have a higher
efault probability, especially when natural disasters happen (i.e.
he Burns’ Day Storm in the early 90s). 
However, firms taking reinsurance performed well during the
008 financial crisis. Four groups have a negative spread and other
wo have a nearly zero spread (0.0062 in group 20% −40% and
.0018 in group 60% −80%). This is a new and important result.
irms taking reinsurance may choose a more determined risk man-
gement strategy and therefore buy good-quality reinsurance to
elp reduce risk at times of financial distress. Doherty and Tinic
1981) find that reinsurance contracts make primary insurers man-
ge cash flow volatility more effectively, and result in better future
nderwriting ability, and lower insolvency probability. Our results
how that, on the other hand, reinsurers also benefit from indem-
ity contracts resulting in lower default probabilities. 
Overall, these findings suggest that firms taking reinsurance
ave a higher insolvency risk than those not doing so, and are
ore vulnerable when natural disasters happen. However, reinsur-
rs outperform other insurers during financial crises. This may be
ue to the fact that their risk management strategy aims at reduc-
ng potential losses during distress times. 
In addition, under Solvency II, reinsurance assets are calculated
n a best-estimate basis, which means that their market value is
he discounted value of future cash flows; therefore, the default
robability of reinsurers plays an important in this estimate. Our
esults clearly show that the insolvency risk of reinsurers depend
n how much reinsurance they take. Thus, when estimating the
uture cash flows of reinsurance assets, the varying default prob-
bility of reinsurers should be taken into account. Given the fact
hat most general insurance firms are not rated, our model could
rovide an alternative way for policy-makers to measure the insol-
ency risk of reinsurers and the market value of reinsurance assets.. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the insolvency risk of general insurance (GI)
rms in the UK using a unique dataset; specifically, a reduced-
orm model is estimated that considers both insolvency and other
ypes of exit such as transferring business. Our results show that
ost traditional risk factors (for example, interest rates, liquidity,
rofitability, leverage etc.) are significant determinants of the in-
olvency risk of insurers. However, in contrast to other studies, we
how that macroeconomic factors (wholesale price and credit pro-
ided by financial institutions) and firm-specific factors (growth
remium written, reinsurance, usage of derivatives and organisa-
ional form) are also crucial for assessing the credit risk of GI firms.
his represents new and interesting evidence. 
Further, we investigate the credit risk of firms with different
usiness lines. We show that in the early 90s, owing to natural dis-
sters, the group Motor had the highest credit risk, while after the
nancial crisis Marine, Aviation & Goods in transit and Financial
oss became the riskiest sectors. Our time-varying estimates of PD
ould be used as an early warning for risky sectors to which reg-
lators might want to apply more stringent minimum capital re-
uirements before firms breach their MCR and SCR. We also show
hat the joint default correlation for different insurance firms is
ow, but there is a default clustering. 
Finally, our findings indicate that different reinsurance levels af-
ect the insolvency risk of insurance firms. Primary insurers can
ower their insolvency risk by buying reinsurance contracts from
einsurers. Moreover, the latter, despite taking on risk from pri-
ary insurers through this process, appear to have an even lower
nsolvency risk during periods of financial distress. The default
robability of reinsurers can be used by policy-makers for the esti-
ation of the market value of reinsurance assets of GI firms under
he new Solvency II. 
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A
1Appendix A. Multi-period other exit estimation outputs-full 
sample 
Horizon 1 2 3 
Parameters 
C 1.762 −2.849 1.885 
(41.041) (10.496) (15.594) 
GDP_growth −0.054 −0.013 −0.007 
(0.160) (0.044) (0.073) 
Real_IR −0.074 −0.006 0.030 
(0.270) (0.073) (0.127) 
Real_EXrate 0.021 0.017 0.011 
(0.088) (0.022) (0.034) 
FDI % −0.024 −0.030 −0.087 
(0.188) (0.063) (0.116) 
Wholesale Price % −8.256 −2.653 −7.135 
(33.567) (8.757) (12.226) 
Credit by Financial % −0.566 −1.753 ∗∗∗ −1.243 
(1.121) (0.676) (1.432) 
PT −2.803 −0.435 −0.931 
(14.372) (3.629) (6.189) 
Lev 0.206 0.310 0.290 
(1.733) (0.404) (0.686) 
Size −0.035 −0.002 0.025 
(0.130) (0.040) (0.064) 
CA −1.277 −1.353 ∗∗∗ −1.017 ∗∗∗
(0.862) (0.306) (0.332) 
GPW % −0.074 −0.042 −0.071 
(0.178) (0.054) (0.111) 
Rein 0.903 0.701 0.565 
(2.607) (0.750) (1.477) 
Claim % 0.054 0.059 ∗∗∗ 0.048 ∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.010) (0.009) 
Growth −0.297 −0.359 ∗ −0.376 
(0.770) (0.214) (0.391) 
Eecess % −0.024 −0.021 −0.038 
(0.116) (0.057) (0.078) 
InvR 9.165 5.986 3.839 
(141.332) (35.631) (64.311) 
Combined Ratio 0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Herfindahl index 1.066 ∗∗∗ 1.328 ∗∗∗ 1.129 ∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.261) (0.250) 
Derivative Dummy 0.736 ∗∗∗ 0.736 ∗∗∗ 0.611 ∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.226) (0.211) 
Organisational Form 0.073 −0.063 −0.172 
(1.279) (0.354) (0.586) 
Log-likelihood −508.2668 
No. of observations 5022 
Note : Multi-period default estimation outputs of other exit 
for 1,2, and 3-year time horizons. Coefficients of constant, GDP 
growth, real interest rate, real exchange rate, foreign direct in- 
vestment %, whole sale price %, credit provided by financial in- 
stitutions %, underwriting profit, leverage, size, cash ratio, gross 
premium written %, reinsurance, incurred claims %, growth, ex- 
cess capital, combined ratio, investment return, Herfindahl index, 
derivative dummy and organisational form based on the full sam- 
ple from 1985 to 2014. The values in parentheses in the table are 
the standard deviations. 
∗Significant at 10%. 
∗∗Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%. ppendix B. Multi-period default estimation outputs –
985–2003 
Horizon 1 2 3 
Parameters 
C –28.819 ∗∗∗ –36.933 –52.267 ∗
(9.384) (92.437) (29.640) 
GDP_growth –0.080 0.083 0.077 
(0.106) (0.386) (0.100) 
Real_IR –0.158 ∗∗ 0.195 –0.151 
(0.078) (0.277) (0.182) 
Real_EXrate 0.026 ∗∗ 0.024 0.036 
(0.013) (0.234) (0.059) 
FDI % 0.597 ∗∗ –0.003 0.137 
(0.245) (1.897) (0.774) 
Wholesale Price % 25.502 ∗∗∗ 26.070 37.479 
(8.829) (65.336) (23.248) 
Credit by Financial % –5.934 ∗∗ –0.681 –0.270 
(2.323) (1.148) (0.696) 
PT –5.387 ∗∗∗ –5.391 –4.779 
(1.283) (14.942) (6.642) 
Lev 0.468 ∗∗∗ 0.513 0.506 
(0.116) (1.531) (0.537) 
Size 0.098 0.140 0.284 ∗
(0.067) (0.551) (0.148) 
CA 1.996 ∗∗∗ 1.977 0.493 
(0.434) (3.151) (1.230) 
GPW % –0.949 ∗∗∗ –0.910 –0.305 
(0.147) (0.802) (0.216) 
Rein 1.014 ∗∗∗ 1.301 1.800 
(0.298) (3.800) (2.068) 
Claim % –0.074 ∗ –0.152 0.009 
(0.043) (0.381) (0.089) 
Growth –0.008 0.118 0.026 
(0.156) (1.030) (0.935) 
Eecess % –0.299 ∗∗ –0.364 ∗∗ –0.121 
(0.131) (0.158) (0.111) 
InvR –32.469 ∗∗∗ –21.424 –0.056 
(5.148) (148.534) (55.823) 
Combined Ratio 0.002 0.0 0 0 –0.018 ∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Herfindahl index 0.139 0.434 1.694 ∗∗∗
(0.458) (1.739) (0.595) 
Derivative Dummy 0.736 ∗∗ 0.393 0.443 
(0.351) (1.436) (0.746) 
Organisational Form 0.136 0.207 0.211 
(0.727) (0.748) (0.779) 
Log-likelihood −24 8.084 9 
No. of observations 3429 
Note : Multi-period default estimation outputs of default for 1, 
2, and 3-year time horizons. Coefficients of constant, GDP growth, 
real interest rate, real exchange rate, foreign direct investment %, 
whole sale price %, credit provided by financial institutions %, un- 
derwriting profit, leverage, size, cash ratio, gross premium written 
%, reinsurance, incurred claims %, growth, excess capital, combined 
ratio, investment return, Herfindahl index, derivative dummy and 
organisational form based on the full sample from 1985 to 2003. 
The values in parentheses in the table are the standard deviations. 
∗ Significant at 10%. 
∗∗ Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%. 
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M  ppendix C. Multi-period default estimation outputs 
Horizon 1 2 3 
Parameters 
C –15.958 ∗∗∗ –24.967 –37.863 
( −5.312) ( −76.076) ( −31.626) 
GDP_growth –0.053 0.041 0.116 
( −0.053) ( −0.489) ( −0.214) 
Real_IR 0.164 ∗∗∗ 0.284 ∗∗ 0.145 
( −0.043) ( −0.133) ( −0.165) 
Real_EXrate 0.004 0.01 0.019 
( −0.009) ( −0.209) ( −0.075) 
FDI % 0.02 –0.159 –0.121 
( −0.073) ( −0.679) ( −0.248) 
Wholesale Price % 12.372 ∗∗∗ 16.387 25.995 
( −4.708) ( −50.363) ( −22.396) 
Credit by Financial % –3.640 ∗∗∗ –0.291 –0.247 
( −1.045) ( −0.465) ( −0.925) 
PT –3.781 ∗∗∗ –3.745 –3.74 
( −1.264) ( −15.975) ( −10.25) 
Lev 0.523 ∗∗∗ 0.551 0.551 
( −0.104) ( −1.551) ( −0.818) 
Size 0.009 0.028 0.115 
( −0.05) ( −0.453) ( −0.185) 
CA 1.027 ∗∗∗ 1.049 –0.456 
( −0.320) ( −1.829) ( −0.907) 
GPW % –0.789 ∗∗∗ –0.565 –0.077 
( −0.121) ( −0.619) ( −0.100) 
Rein 0.822 ∗∗∗ 1.118 1.544 
( −0.237) ( −4.185) ( −2.698) 
Claim % –0.023 –0.061 0.024 
( −0.024) ( −0.237) ( −0.047) 
Growth 0.025 0.118 0.021 
( −0.118) ( −0.906) ( −1.134) 
Eecess % –0.388 ∗∗∗ –0.45 –0.217 
( −0.127) ( −0.332) ( −0.233) 
InvR –30.644 ∗∗∗ –21.03 –2.692 
( −4.766) ( −161.663) ( −85.657) 
Combined Ratio 0.003 ∗∗∗ 0.002 –0.004 ∗∗
( −0.001) ( −0.004) ( −0.002) 
Herfindahl index 0.397 0.763 1.759 ∗∗∗
( −0.408) ( −1.645) ( −0.542) 
Derivative Dummy 0.628 ∗ 0.162 0.25 
( −0.335) ( −1.759) ( −0.946) 
Organisational Form 0.969 ∗∗∗ 0.551 0.621 
( −0.310) ( −1.985) ( −0.822) 
Log-likelihood -508.2668 
No. of observations 5022 
Note : Multi-period default estimation outputs of default for 1,2, 
and 3-year time horizons. Coefficients of constant, GDP growth, real 
interest rate, real exchange rate, foreign direct investment %, whole 
sale price %, credit provided by financial institutions %, underwriting 
profit, leverage, size, cash ratio, gross premium written %, reinsurance, 
incurred claims %, growth, excess capital, combined ratio, investment 
return, Herfindahl index, derivative dummy and organisational form 
based on the full sample from 1985 to 2014. The values in parenthe- 
ses in the table are the standard deviations. 
The derivative dummy is defined as being equal to 1 for insurance 
firms using derivatives for hedging, and 0 for the others. 
∗ Significant at 10%. 
∗∗ Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%. 
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